In a revealing account of historical significance, diplomat and former Chief of Staff to the President, Prof. Ibrahim Gambari, disclosed the circumstances surrounding the loss of former President Olusegun Obasanjo in the race to become the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN). Gambari elucidated that Obasanjo’s military background played a pivotal role in disqualifying him from selection by nations with veto power.
These revelations were made during a public presentation of the biography of the first African UN Secretary-General, the late Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The event took place on Wednesday and was marked by the launch of the biography, the first of its kind in English, titled “Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Afro-Arab Prophet, Pharaoh, and Pope.” This biography was crafted by Prof. Adekeye Adebajo.
The book launch, hosted at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs on Victoria Island, featured Ambassador Martin Uhomoibhi as the reviewer, alongside the presence of the NIIA Director General, Prof. Eghosa Osaghae.
Recalling the pivotal moment that led to Boutros-Ghali’s appointment as the UN Secretary-General in 1991, Gambari shared an intriguing anecdote. He recounted how a foreign envoy once remarked to him, “Your candidate (Olusegun Obasanjo) has no chance in hell of becoming secretary.”
In response, Gambari inquired, “What do you mean? He is the most qualified former head of state, handed over power voluntarily to civilians, and was head of the group that led to the process of the end of apartheid.”
The envoy’s explanation, however, offered profound insight into the selection process. He stated, “No. Listen carefully, when we, the big ones, are looking for a Sec Gen, the emphasis is on the secretary and not on the general.” This statement underscored the preference for diplomats over military figures for the Secretary-General role.
Gambari further elaborated, “The thing was that the veto ruling power wanted somebody they could dictate to, not a general, who would be giving them orders. Sometimes they think they are getting a secretary but they end up getting a general.”
This perspective sheds light on the dynamics at play during high-level international appointments. Gambari concluded by noting that Ghali and Koffi Annan, both Secretary-Generals of the UN, defied expectations, proving to be more assertive and less compliant with the veto powers.
The biography’s author, Adekeye Adebajo, expounded on the choice of the book’s title, highlighting Boutros-Ghali’s role as a peace-making prophet during Egypt’s peace treaty negotiations with Israel between 1977 and 1981. Gambari also touched upon the peaks and valleys of Boutros-Ghali’s career, emphasizing the UN’s failure to respond adequately during the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which he deemed a low point in the late diplomat’s tenure.
This historical account offers valuable insights into the complex world of international diplomacy and the intricacies of selecting UN leaders.
